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Review Essay
What Did You Do in the "Good War"?
Klaus Umer, "Let's Swallow Switzerland": Hitler's Plans Against the
Swiss Confederation (Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, 2001)
Stephen Tanner, Refuge from the Reich: American Airmen and
Switzerland During World War II
(Sarpedon Publishers, Rockville Center, New York, 2000)
Angelo M. Codevilla, Between the Alps and a Hard Place: Switzerland in
World War II and Moral Blackmail Today (Regnery Publishing, Washington,
D.C., 2000)
If, as in Tom Wolfe's phrase, the 1970s were the decade of the "me
generation", perhaps the 1990s could be termed the "mea culpa" decade. The
United States government belatedly and properly apologized and paid
reparations to thousands of Japanese-American who had been unjustly interned
in the panic that followed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Holocaust
survivors and their heirs have successfully retrieved art and other assets stolen
from them or their ancestors. Slave laborers have sought settlements from
companies that profited from their exploitation. Mexican-American veterans
of the wartime "bracero" guest worker program are seeking refunds, with
interest, of money withheld from their meager wages. In such cases restitution
or reparations as well as a public admission of wrongdoing are legally and
morally justified as well as long overdue.
But in other instances one could question the reach and logic of historical
remediation. For example, President Clinton publicly apologized for the
institution of slavery. Given his humble roots it is doubtful that any of his
ancestors owned slaves. Certainly the last survivor of slavery in the United
States died long before Clinton became President. But the President's
politically correct act of contrition for past sins of others did not deter a
campaign to collect reparations for those who could claim descent from those
sinned against. Recently those delayed damage claims have been extended to
include third parties such as life insurance companies that did business with
slave owners by issuing policies on slaves. That such transactions in no way
harmed the slave whose life was insured is lost in the guilt-by-association logic
of the accusers. It would seem that such illogic is part of what one of the
authors of the works under review here calls "moral blackmail"; a political ploy
similar to nuisance law suits that target "deep pockets" or wealthy defendants
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in the hope that the desire to avoid negative publicity will produce a settlement
in the form of money damages regardless of the facts of the case. 79
Readers of this journal do not have to be reminded of the recriminations
and accusations leveled during the last decade regarding Switzerland's
financial dealings with the Third Reich, its immigration policies and the
Holocaust, and the general sense in this era of celebrating the "Greatest
Generation" that neutrality during World War II was itself immoral and
cowardly. To be sure, in specific instances some of these accusations are well
founded. In its financial affairs and immigration policies it can hardly be said
that World War II was Switzerland's fmest hour. There definitely is a dark side
to that history. But history is lived forward, not in hindsight. Some of today's
accusers are casting stones from decidedly transparent and breakable vantage
points. In the journalistic genre of "gotcha" what one American newsmagazine
writer called "the snug, smug Swiss" have become targets for having been not
only neutral in World War II, but pro-Nazi, de facto allies of Hitler's
murderous regime. The growing popular belief that Switzerland, both its
government and its people, were willing collaborators in the execution of
Hitler's genocidal megalomania is a distortion of history. The works under
discussion here help put that history in perspective.
Although they treat different aspects of the Swiss experience in World War
II, taken together, these three books form a powerful rebuttal to the recent wave
of criticism of Swiss neutrality and the accusations of collaboration and war
profiteering. Based upon careful research in the documentary record, they
demonstrate several important truths often lost or ignored in the debate over
who did what or didn't do enough to save victims and defeat Hitler's evil
empire in the 'Good War'.
The quotation in the title of Klaus Umer' s book "Let's Swallow
Switzerland" came from Hitler's mouth. What sort of indigestion might have
followed swallowing such a tough morsel is one of the unknowable "what ifs"
of history. But Umer, Professor and Head of the archives for Contemporary
History at the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, convincingly shows
that the threat of a German invasion in 1940 was not just Hitler's table talk. It
was very real; a clear and present danger that Swiss military and political
leaders had to take seriously. Literally surrounded by forces more than twenty
times the size and strength of their own, the Swiss position during the war was
unlike that of any other nation. That Switzerland was able to avoid being
swallowed by the beast at its door, indeed all around it, is a testament to its
skill, courage and not least to its mountainous terrain.

79

A controversial but often cogent critique of the reparations argument is David Horowitz,
Uncivil Wars: The Controversy Over Reparations for Slavery (Encounter Books, 2001).
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This slim volume originally appeared in German in 1990. A French version
followed in 1996. This translation by Lotti Eichhorn brings it to a broader
readership at a time when its message is particularly useful. It is a masterly
piece of meticulous historical detective work in what is an ·incomplete and
scattered documentary record. The fragmentary nature of the manuscript
sources had made it virtually impossible to fully document Hitler's plans for
dealing with Switzerland after the defeat of France. The subsequent mutually
beneficial economic and trade relations between the two countries obscured the
possibility that Hitler had ever viewed Switzerland as a target for military
conquest. The lack of credible evidence to the contrary gave rise to the thesis
that Hitler saw himself as the "protector" of the Swiss. 80 Urner' s work dispels
that myth by showing that from June 1940 until the approach of Allied troops
in August 1944 Hitler's aim was to keep Switzerland in a state of siege. Even
in retreat German forces were ordered "to keep Switzerland surrounded as
much as possible. " 81
This hostility toward Switzerland was most evident in the early planning
for a military takeover of the country in 1940.That this threat of invasion and
occupation was more than simply a bluff or the sort of contingency planning
generated by military bureaucrats with nothing better to do is clear in the
details of the military plan, originally termed "Special Task Switzerland." The
plan in its later version as operation "Tannenbaum" has been known to
historians for some time. But Urner, drawing on notes by the author of the
original draft who was killed at Stalingrad, puts forth a new and convincing
interpretation of its meaning. He argues that the impetus for the plan came
directly from Hitler and arose from his failure to completely isolate
Switzerland from unoccupied France.
If, as lawyers say, the devil is in the details, so, too, it is often the details
that reveal larger historical truths. Thanks to Urner' s persistence in pursuit of
missing records we now know that the invasion plan was aimed at
Switzerland's western borders and was to be carried out by nine divisions of
the German 12th Army. The Italians were to simultaneously attack from the
south. At that moment Swiss defense plans had, in Umer's words, "suffered a
disaster without having been tested." The French Army Corps that, under secret
prewar plans, was to have protected the Swiss western flank had dissolved into
thousands of demoralized refugees streaming into Switzerland. With Italy's
entry into the war exposing its southern frontier and its army committed to

80

See for example: Fred David, "Unter Hitler's schutzender Hand," [Under Hitler's
Protecting Hand] Cash 32 (August 1997).
81
A collection of essays expanding upon the state of siege thesis and other aspects of
wartime Switzerland is Leo Schelbert, ed. Switzerland Under Siege, 1939-1945 (Picton
Press, 2000)
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defending the northern border, Switzerland was open to invasion from the west.
According to Urner such an invasion "would have reached its goal in a very
short time."
That goal was, if not the total conquest of the country, at minimum the
occupation of the Swiss plateau via the Juras, capturing much of the industrial
base and establishing a transit corridor to Southern France and Italy. German
estimates of the demoralized state of Swiss morale, the fatalism of its political
leaders, and the "totally inferior" quality of the Swiss military led planners to
speculate that a "warlike border crossing" might result in capitulation and a
"peaceful invasion." 82 General Guisan's revised "Reduit" [Redoubt] war plan
to fall back to the more defensible Alpine regions would not have prevented
Hitler from gaining what he wanted from Switzerland in the summer of 1940.
Why then didn't Hitler attack when he had the chance? Reconstructing what
went through Hitler's twisted mind is always challenging. But Urner debunks
the theory, based on table talk nearly two years later, that in June 1940 Hitler's
goal from the outset was to make Switzerland an unoccupied protectorate.
Given the circumstances of the moment, such a theory doesn't fit the facts. As
Urner shows, Hitler had other priorities including dealing with the British
either by invasion, which for the moment was thought too risky, or a peace
settlement forced by air attack. Occupied Switzerland's value as a transit
corridor to Southern France was undercut by the French armistice. With the
failure to bring about British capitulation, offensive priorities shifted to
preparation for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Only later was Switzerland's
usefulness as a trading partner and financial clearing house clear to Hitler. In
Urner's view in June 1940 Hitler was both ready and willing to attack
Switzerland at the first opportunity. In his contempt for the Swiss, who along
with the neutral Swedes he considered "kleine Dreckstaaten" [small muck
states], Hitler saw the invasion as a modest military undertaking, noting that it
could be accomplished by a single S.S. division. As Stephen Halbrook has
pointed out in his recent study of Swiss armed neutrality during the war,
"swallowing" Switzerland may have proved more difficult than Hitler thought.
The second half of Urner's volume treats Hitler's attempt to cut off
Switzerland by waging economic warfare in the form of a counter blockade
during the period before the complete takeover of France by Germany in
November 1942. Here again the details speak volumes. Urner shows that the
German counter blockade was not entirely effective. Swiss manufacturers and
merchants devised ingenious legal and semi-legal loopholes in the trade
restrictions. An example is the export to Britain via unoccupied France of
electric ignition times disguised as Swiss watches. Until the German takeover

82

The quotations are from the English translations of the German war plans reprinted in the
"Documents" appendices in Umer, Lets Swallow Switzerland, pp. 133-176.
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of Vichy in November 1942 such illicit trade, including American O.S.S.
agents such as Allen Dulles, flowed through Switzerland's "hidden door to the
West."
Although interesting, this portion of Umer's work touches on only one
aspect of the larger subject of Swiss economic policy during the war. Despite
relatively minor leakage in the German counter blockade, arms exports, which
in 1940 had been essentially equally divided among the belligerents, in 1941
tripled for Germany and Italy and went to zero on the Allied side of the ledger.
It is true that during the war Switzerland imported more than it exported. But
there is no denying the fact that both qualitatively and quantitatively the Swiss
contributed to the German and Italian war effort. 83
Totally conquered, partially occupied or an unoccupied protectorate and
trading partner, what the ultimate fate of Switzerland would be in the minds of
Hitler and his entourage is clear from Hitler's Propaganda Minister Joseph
Goebbels' repeated references to Switzerland's "nasty" neutrality and the need
to "settle accounts" with the Swiss once the war was won.
One of the reasons the Germans so resented Swiss neutrality was the fact
that it provided safe haven for those who were bombing them with increasingly
devastating effect. In Refuge from the Reich Stephen Tanner, who has written
on wars from Julius Caesar to George Bush the first, tells a little known and
even less appreciated-except by the surviving air crews-story of the
American airmen who were forced down in Swiss territory during the war.
These Americans fell from the sky into a neutral but fully mobilized
Switzerland. After hearing the words: "For you the war is over" they soon
discovered that the Swiss took the rules of neutrality seriously. Tanner's book
provides a fascinating account of how the new long range bombing campaign
of World War II collided with the centuries old Swiss tradition of armed
neutrality. These uninvited involuntary visitors from the world's largest
democracy suddenly found themselves guests for the duration in the world's
smallest democracy, an armed camp surrounded by hostile neighbors. Although
relatively few in number, totaling just over 1700, the experience of these
interned Americans speaks volumes about how the Swiss people's pro-Allied
sentiment coexisted with the policy of armed neutrality.
Although both are valuable to the specialist, Tanner's work is a more
readable account than an earlier volume on the subject entitled Strangers in a
Strange Land. 84 Tanner's treatment is rich in descriptive detail of aerial
combat, harrowing crash landings, and escape attempts. He combines a talent

83

Hans Meier, "Between Hammer and Anvil: Neutrality and the Necessity of Trade," in
Schelbert, Switzerland Under Siege, p. 133.
84
Hans-Heiri Stapfer and Gino Kunzie, Strangers in a Strange Land: Escape to Neutrality
(Squadron/Signal, 1992).
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for story telling with an historian's appreciation for context in the form of a
brief dual history of America's rise to power and Swiss armed neutrality. Along
with a description of the developing air war in the skies overhead, he draws a
vivid portrait of life, not just of the American internees, but of the society in
which they found themselves.
As Tanner points out, under international law these Americans who
crashed landed or bailed out over Switzerland were "internees", who with rare
exception such as an agreed upon exchange, could not be repatriated during the
war. Instead they were to be housed, fed, and guarded, rather loosely, by the
Swiss military for the duration. For the vast majority that was the period from
August 1943 when the long-range strategic bombing of Germany got into full
gear. The flight paths of the B-1 7s and B 24s of the U.S. 8th Air Force based in
England and the 15 th Air Force flying from North Africa and southern Italy
converged over Switzerland. By the summer of 1944 as many as 10 bombers
a day were forced to find safety on Swiss soil, adding another 100 or so
Americans to the internee population of some 100,000 foreign troops.
What little those Americans knew about the quaint land of cuckoo clocks,
watches and chocolate was soon dispelled by their arrival in quarters, often in
former resort hotels, that were often ill-heated, with strictly rationed food and
few amenities. The stereotype of the prosperous Swiss living the good life was
replaced by the reality of a people who were "cold and thin." The Americans
lost weight on the 1500 calorie daily diet of the Swiss army, complained about
the all-but meatless menu, and fought boredom with endless card games and
occasional skiing and snowball fights. Those who tried to escape could find
themselves in the punishment camp at Wauwilermoos, run by a corrupt Nazi
sympathizer, but hardly a concentration camp. The usual sentence for
attempted escape was 30 days confinement. Of the nearly 1000 flyers who
attempted to escape, less than 200 were caught. The rest simply slipped away,
often with the help of Swiss civilians and the tacit acquiescence of those
assigned to guard or catch them.
Most interned Americans, however, spent the war in isolated ski resorts
such as Adelboden, renamed Camp Moloney after a ball turret gunner killed
when his B-17 crashed in Lake Constance. In general the Americans found the
natives friendly. From the Swiss Air Force pilots who, although flying
German-made Messerschmitt 109s, kindly escorted crippled bombers to
landing fields, to anti-aircraft crews who obligingly withheld fire or
deliberately aimed their rounds to avoid damaging the intruding aircraft85 ; to
the civilians on the ground who saw the glamorous flyers as heroes, the

85

After the American bombing of Schaffhausen, Basel, Zurich and other Swiss towns,
killing over 50 civilians, some AA crews began to take their jobs more seriously and
managed to down at least one B-17.
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Americans, if not exactly welcome, were treated well by their officially neutral
hosts.
Obviously an admirer of the Swiss, Tanner sees the United States and
Switzerland as "Sister Republics" who during the war "resisted Nazism, each
in its own way, according to separate traditions." Judging from the many first
hand accounts used in his book, most of the Americans who spent the
remainder of their war in Switzerland would agree.
The last of this coincidental trilogy is Angelo Codevilla'sBetween the Alps
and a Hard Place. In it Codevilla, a professor of international relations at
Boston University, author of a number of books on war and statecraft, and
former adviser to the Senate on intelligence policy, confronts directly the
recent accusations of Swiss culpability for the Holocaust, financial
malfeasance, and other alleged criminal or immoral activities. Borrowing
Daniel Boorstin' s phrase, he calls this recent discovery of Swiss villainy during
World War II a "pseudo event", i.e. something that is real only to the extent
that the media makes it so. In the process of making his case, he exposes the
politics behind such finger pointing and the attendant distortions of history in
pursuit of what he calls "moral blackmail." As someone who once dared to
criticize the CJ.A. on intelligence policy, Codevilla is not afraid to take on
politically powerful opponents nor does he pull any punches in making his
argument. That argument rejects as a myth the idea that the Swiss people or
their government willingly collaborated with the Nazi and Fascist regimes. In
his view Switzerland acted, not as an ally of the Axis, but in response to the
realities of the balance of power and in its own national interest. Moreover, he
argues that the myth of Swiss collaboration was fabricated as a part of a
campaign, supported by the Clinton administration for its own short term
political gain, to "shake down" Swiss banks. In Codevilla's view the 1.25
billion dollar settlement by Swiss banks in 1998 was nothing more than a
"bribe" or "protection money" paid in order to continue to do business in the
United States.
Codevilla' s book is a must read for anyone interested in understanding, not
only Switzerland's role in World War II, but how what should be the lessons
of that history have been perverted in recent years to serve political ends in the
present. In the process, argues Codevilla, we dishonor the past, distort modem
memory, and promote "dangerously wrong conclusions about how the world
works."
His book works on two levels. First it sets forth a very clear and persuasive
analysis of how Switzerland used a combination of deterrence, defiance and
cooperation to survive and retain a degree of independence while surrounded
by the hostile powers of Hitler's Germany and Mussolin's Italy. On a second
level it argues that in the last half of the 1990s the Clinton administration sold
out to powerful supporters, led by billionaire Edgar Bronfman, within the
Democratic Party in accepting a version of history that is not supported by the
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facts. Codevilla contends that editors, journalists and commentators, ignorant
of the facts, were manipulated by sensational stories of "Nazi gold" being
laundered in Switzerland and images of munitions rolling off Swiss assembly
lines destined for Hitler's army. Codevilla points out that the "Third Reich
would not have been satisfied with chocolate" and that Germany controlled the
imports that Switzerland needed to sustain its army and keep its people from
starving and freezing. As for the question of did the Swiss do enough to save
Jews and other victims of the Holocaust, Codevilla says "yes" if compared to
the per capita percentage of refugees accepted by the United States, but "no"
if measured against the number that, in hindsight, might have been admitted. 86
Space doesn't permit a full discussion of the many valuable insights
Codevilla provides in Between the Alps and a Hard Place. It will have to
suffice to say here that he makes a convincing case that what in the mid 1990s
sprang so suddenly into public discourse about Switzerland's role in World
War II was more myth in pursuit of political and financial profit than a real or
serious contribution to our understanding of the history of international
relations. That it so quickly passed from the headlines and political
commentary once "reparations" were paid says a great deal about how and why
the affair happened.
In support of his views about the true meaning of Swiss neutrality during
the war Codevilla invokes the authority of two masters of balance of power
politics. The first is Niccolo Machiavelli, who in 1512 praised Swiss statecraft
and made the connection between military power and independence when he
described the Swiss as "the most armed and the most free" people in the world.
The second authority on power and national interest is Winston Churchill who
as World War II came to a close observed:
"Of all the neutrals, Switzerland has the greatest right to distinction. She
has been the sole international force linking the hideously sundered
nations and ourselves. What does it matter that if she has not been able to
give us commercial advantage we desire or has given too many to the
Germans to keep herself alive? She has been a democratic state standing
for freedom in self-defense among her mountains, and in thought, in spite
of her race, largely on our side."
Codevilla makes clear that the vast majority of Swiss people "despised the
Nazis viscerally", but that given its unique circumstances of being literally
surrounded and at the mercy of Axis power, Switzerland as a democratic nation
state had little choice about what and how many "commercial advantages" it
might give to its stronger neighbors. He points out that as German power
86

On how Swiss government refugee policy differed from public sentiment see Alfred
Hasler, The Lifeboat is Full (Funk & Wagnall's, 1969).
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waned the Swiss capitalized on the changing circumstances. In his view the
Swiss in World War II practiced statecraft as it should be done, based on a
realistic assessment of threat, power and national interest. Codevilla sees this
as a realistic approach to international relations. The goal of his book is to
instill a similar realism and seriousness in the American approach to foreign
affairs that has been sorely lacking in recent years.
In World War II the Swiss were indeed between "the Alps and a hard
place". Neutrality was their traditional solution to their unique predicament. By
the luck of a topography less suited than that of other countries to Blitzkrieg
tactics, an avowed determination by its military to fight "to the last man", and
Hitler's changing priorities, they avoided invasion in 1940. By refusing the
Luftwaffe access to its airspace they opened their skies to crippled allied
bombers and provided refuge to their crews. They permitted "commercial
advantages" to Germany because they were in no position to deny them. But
they never joined the Axis cause. Nor did they, even as the Third Reich
collapsed, officially join the Allied side. In their hearts, however, it was clear
even at the time whose side they were "largely" on. As one joke among allied
economic advisers during the war put it: Six days a week the Swiss work for
the Germans. On Sunday they pray for an Allied victory. If this joke reflects
reality, and I think history shows that it does, in the end their prayers were
answered. Thus it would seem that they have nothing to apologize for.

Robert Messer
University ofIllinois at Chicago
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